

# Ex post evaluation – Tri-National de la Sangha (TNS)

## >>> Project of the International Climate Initiative (IKI)



**IKI funding area:** Protection of Biological Diversity (funding area 4)


**Project:** Protection and Management of the Sangha Tri-National Transboundary Forest Complex (Project number 209810326, BMUB 08\_II\_063\_CMUR\_K)

**Implementing Agency:** Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund Limited

**Countries:** Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic

### Ex post evaluation report: 2018

		Plan	Actual
Total Costs	Mio. EUR	1,452	1,451
Co-Payment	Mio. EUR	0	0
Total Grant	Mio. EUR	1,452	1,451
Of which IKI funds	Mio. EUR	1,452	1,451*



\*) The original grant was cut in the amount of remaining funds of less than 0,001 million EUR.

**Summary:** Lack of financing and coordinated management of transnationally interconnected protected areas poses problems for the effectiveness of environmental policy. This is why the joint National Park Association “Tri-National de la Sangha (TNS)” was created in 2000. The total TNS park area covers approximately 44.000 km<sup>2</sup>, including the three contiguous national parks, Lobeke (2.178 km<sup>2</sup>) in Cameroon, Dzanga-Ndoki (1.254 km<sup>2</sup>) in the Central African Republic and Nouabale-Ndoki (4.250 km<sup>2</sup>) in the Republic of the Congo, and their surrounding buffer zones. A Foundation for supporting the TNS, the Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS), was created in 2007. The IKI project funded through the FTNS as implementing agency the development and validation of a long-term land-use plan for the TNS area, the organization of transnational anti-poaching brigades (feasibility study, infrastructure, equipment, recruitment, training and monitoring), the construction and maintenance of small infrastructure (roads, surveillance and tourism facilities) and some research activities.

**Objectives:** The project goal (outcome) was to kick-start a transnational management scheme for the three interdependent protected areas. As the long-term overarching objective (impact), the transnational management scheme should contribute to the preservation of ecosystem services, by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and in particular by protecting endangered species and habitat diversity (objectives adapted ex-post). Furthermore, a social component sought to improve the livelihoods of the local population by promoting sustainable income alternatives.


**Target Group:** Governmental institutions with a mandate for forest protection and protected area management and (indirectly) the population in the project region. A global benefit is expected from the reduction of carbon emissions.

## Overall grade: 3 – (moderately) satisfactory

**Rationale:** The project was relevant and well aligned with biodiversity conservation efforts in the Congo Basin. It allowed the institutional and financial start-up of the TNS. However, actual operating results are modest, commensurate with the amount of funding. The impact of protected areas

on conservation is still very limited and their sustainability is fragile. Tensions between the ecological and socio-economic needs threaten the natural wealth of the TNS.

**Highlights:** With a limited amount of funding, the project has initiated promising transnational conservation dynamics.



## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 3 - (moderately) satisfactory

In deviation from the usual aggregation rules explained in the annex, we make use of the possibility given in exceptional cases to rate the project as overall satisfactory although sustainability was rated as unsatisfactory. The reason for this is the following: Right from the start, no more than a kick off for transnational management could be expected from the project which actually was achieved. It would have been far too ambitious to expect a significant contribution to solve the root problem of tensions between the ecological and socio-economic dimension of sustainability in the project area. The project did help, however, to “buy time” and delay the deterioration process of natural resources.

#### Lessons Learned

- Grants of limited amounts and duration as provided by IKI can be used to kick off ambitious conservation dynamics.
- The strategy adopted at the TNS is relevant and contributes to curbing further environmental degradation at national parks' level in the medium term. However, it cannot stop degradation. This is particularly true for the TNS landscape on the edges of the parks. In the absence of governance improvements and credible alternative approaches for economic development, destruction of biodiversity will not be avoided in the long run. Nevertheless, projects like the one evaluated here help “to buy time”.
- Effectiveness of support for environmental conservation and protection of biodiversity via positive incentives often depends on an effective complementary system of coercive measures in order to penalize infringements of rules and regulations. The impact of positive incentives is limited when armed conflicts with poachers belong to the sad reality of areas under protection, as in the case evaluated here.
- The capitalization of a nature fund like the FTNS Trust Fund with its revenues dedicated to supporting parks is an effective approach to ensure predictable basic resource flows for the park management in a sustainable way, even if the amount of funding is limited and, taken individually, is insufficient to ensure a stable governance of conservation activities.

#### General methodological approach of the ex-post evaluation

The ex-post evaluation represents an expert judgement and applies the methodology of a contribution analysis. It attributes outcomes and impacts to the project by plausibility considerations based on the careful analysis of data, facts and impressions. Causes of potentially contradictory information are investigated, trying to eliminate such contradictions, basing conclusions – wherever possible – on several different data sources (triangulation). The analysis is based on hypotheses, presumed result chains and interdependencies, described in the impact matrix developed at project appraisal (PA) and reviewed during the ex post evaluation (EPE). This evaluation report sets out arguments as to why which factors have an influence on the identified outcomes and impacts and why the project under evaluation was likely to provide the contribution that it did. An evaluation conception represents the reference frame for the evaluation. Before the field mission, a questionnaire based on the study of documents and literature was sent to the project management organization (FTNS). A delegation of the independent evaluation unit of KfW (FZE) visited Yaoundé, Cameroon, from

12<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> February 2018 to conduct interviews with resource persons and representatives of the following institutions: FTNS, COMIFAC, MIFOFO, MINEPDED, WWF, WCS, the French AFD, GIZ and KfW (detailed list in annex). Additionally, a consultant visited two of the three TNS protected areas (Cameroon and Central African Republic) and conducted interviews with different stakeholders (park managers, tourism stakeholders and eco-guardians) based on a predefined discussion guide. However, movement was restricted due to security reasons. Accordingly, interviews with the local population were not conducted. A major information source was the analysis of the following data: data from socio-economic, anthropological and environmental scientific studies on the area, administrative data from protected areas and surrounding forestry operations, land cover classification and loss of forest cover by satellite imagery.

### Cameroon, Republic of Congo and Central African Republic at a glance

	Cameroon	Republic of Congo	Central African Republic
<b>Area</b>	475,442 km <sup>2</sup>	342,821 km <sup>2</sup>	622,984 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Forest cover (2010)</b> - Share of land area	247,414 km <sup>2</sup> - 32 %	215,733 km <sup>2</sup> - 63 %	382,688 km <sup>2</sup> - 61 %
<b>Population and growth rate (2016)</b>	23,439,189 (+ 2,6 %)	5,125,821 (+ 2,6 %)	4,594,621 (+ 1,1 %)
<b>Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2016)</b>	1,374 current USD (- 1.8 % 2015-2016)	1,528 current USD (- 4.4% 2015-2016)	382 current USD (+ 3.4 % 2015-2016)
<b>Population under national poverty line</b>	37.5 % (2014)	46.5 % (2011)	62 % (2008)
<b>Human Development Index (2015)</b>	0.518 (Rang 154)	0.592 (Rang 135)	0.352 (Rang 188)
<b>CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita (2015)</b>	0.3 t (Rang 191/220)	2.6 t (Rang 122/220)	0.1 t (Rang 214/220)

Sources: <https://data.worldbank.org>, <http://hdr.undp.org> and <http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions>, [www.globalforestwatch.org](http://www.globalforestwatch.org).

### General context, project classification and project measures

The Congo Basin encompasses six countries (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Central African Republic – CAR –, the Republic of Congo – RC –, and the Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC). It is home to the world's second-largest tropical forest after the Amazon rainforest, with about 1.8 million km<sup>2</sup> of forested area. In 1999, the Heads of State of the respective countries signed the "Yaoundé Declaration" aiming at the conservation and sustainable management of these forests. It called for a more transparent allocation of forest concessions, the promotion of forests' sustainable use, the setting up of protected areas -

including transboundary protected areas - and the establishment of long-term financing mechanisms for effective management involving local populations. By 2006, about 185,100 km<sup>2</sup> (10 %) of the Congo Basin forests were classified as protected areas and 494,000 km<sup>2</sup> (36 %) were under forest concessions. The TNS is one of seven transboundary associations of national parks established in the sub-region in the early 2000's as a result of this political impetus. Its creation was officially ratified within the framework of COMIFAC (Central African Forests Commission) in 2000 by a cooperation agreement signed by the Ministers in charge of Forests in Cameroon, CAR and RC.

TNS cooperation aims at coordinating efforts between the three national parks with regard to conservation, research, management, sustainable development, tourism and anti-poaching. The Foundation for the TNS (FTNS) was registered in 2007 in the UK as a charitable private entity to fund conservation in the three parks and sustainable management promotion in their surrounding areas. Its registration as a non-profit association in Cameroon was effective by 2010. Before then, WWF Cameroon served as the legal and administrative basis for the FTNS executive office.

Considering that TNS was created back in 2000, the FTNS institution building and fund-raising process started off rather slowly. In the course of time, it became more and more urgent to build momentum and keep the three TNS partners' motivated. Against this background, the BMUB project came just in time. Appraised in 2006 and disbursement starting in 2008, it was the first financing project to reach FTNS. This timing needs to be taken into account in order to fully appreciate the significance of the project, since its official objectives were rather ambitious and did not really correspond to what could be expected from the project measures, which were suited to lay basic foundations for transnational park surveillance (more see below under effectiveness and impact).

The project measures were the following:

- Update and facilitate the adoption of a land use plan covering the three parks and the surrounding landscape;
- Establish an operational transnational anti-poaching brigade;
- Improve the level of tourism and conservation infrastructure and equipment in the parks with corresponding small training courses as accompanying measures. Further, there were trail maintenance works in Cameroon and RC; renovation and equipment of the Bayanga health post in CAR; ecological restoration activities in former lumber-yards in Cameroon.
- Carry out research activities in Cameroon, in particular an assessment of the CO<sub>2</sub> stock in Lobéké and diagnostic and mapping works for the ecological restoration of the lumber-yards mentioned above.


### Maps of the project area

The national park boundaries seem fairly well defined and recognized by most stakeholders (except the mining sector, see below). Their reported surfaces vary slightly ( $\pm 5$  %) from one source to another, due to slight differences in the layout versions, and especially due to the different geomatic reference systems used to calculate the areas. Quite contrastingly, the boundaries of the peripheral zone vary greatly from one source to another. In the World Heritage classification of humanity by UNESCO and also in single documents of the FTNS, the peripheral zone includes only neighboring forest concessions, to form a total area (including parks) of 25,000 km<sup>2</sup>. However, the area is much larger according to most of the FTNS documents, notably the land use plan drawn up under the BMUB project (see map below), covering a total area of 44,000 km<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, in CAR the area known as the "special reserve" is sometimes classified as a protected area although it has a vague status offering only weak guarantees of protection (category VI according to the IUCN classification, whereas



national parks are of category II) and even this status is hardly recognized by the authorities and other local actors (see examples below). Nevertheless, project partners refer to APDS (protected areas of Dzanga Sangha) when they refer to both Dzanga Ndoki National Park and the special reserve.

**Figure 1: Conservation and human activities in the Sangha landscape**



FZE own analysis. Sources: National and concession boundaries, roads and main rivers from WRI/MINFOF/MEFDD/MEFCP forest atlases for Congo Basin (2013); protected areas boundaries from UNEP-WCMC/ IUCN Protected Planet WDPA (2018); Deforestation Data from Hansen/UMD/Google/USGS/NASA (2017).

## Relevance

In line with the lack of compatibility between very ambitious objectives and limited project measures, the expected impact chain was only partly spelled out in the appraisal document. In an attempt to reconstruct a realistic impact chain from the information available, the evaluation team came up with the following: Financial and technical support for the FTNS (input) is expected to lead to specific outputs, in particular a land use plan for the three parks, improved infrastructure for tourism and park management, and a transnational anti-poaching brigade, that serve as a kick-start to establish an ecologically and socio-economically sustainable transnational management of the parks (outcome). Involving the local population in the selection of project measures was intended to gain their support. This outcome is expected to contribute to the preservation of ecosystem services by protecting endangered species and habitat diversity and the forests' carbon stock (impacts).

Undoubtedly, these objectives were and still are highly relevant as the Congo basin is covered by the world's second largest tropical forest and is home to thousands of species. Of its 10,000 plant species alone, about 30 % are estimated to be endemic. To preserve the habitat of fauna and flora nature protection must go beyond national borders. Conservation efforts have to be harmonized and cover the whole area. The (reconstructed) result chain is, all in all, plausible, even if there are major risks involved that could undermine expected results (see below). The intended impacts regarding the protection of biodiversity, but also forests to mitigate climate change, are priority targets for IKI. Accordingly, the project is very much in line with the objectives of this funding source.

The project is also well aligned with partners' priorities. The respective governments demonstrated their joint commitment to the conservation of the Congo Basin's natural habitat with a common declaration already back in 1999 (see above). Actually, right from the start, the TNS initiative in general and the project to be evaluated here in particular benefitted from an unequivocal buy-in and appropriation by the partners, who were fully committed to the objectives of the project. Some organizational arrangements have raised reluctance: the sharing of roles between NGOs and the park administration occasionally creates tensions and these actors sometimes find it difficult to comply with the FTNS accounting procedures, but all actors comply with the principle of collaboration and coordination.

On the way from project inputs to intended impacts there are some risks, however, concerning the support of local populations. They have been formally consulted during park establishment and land use planning. We are not in a position to retrospectively assess whether this consultation process was truly participatory. It can be stated though, that population expectations are reflected in some of the measures prioritized under the BMUB project (health infrastructures in CAR and tourism promotion). It has to be recognized, however, that these measures are in no way sufficient to improve livelihoods of the local populations in a manner that would prevent them from the usage of natural resources in an unsustainable way. It is their tradition to use the forests for firewood and hunting, the latter not only for their own diet, but also for bush meat as one of the few marketable goods.

Furthermore, the current conservation policy remains difficult to reconcile with measures likely to stimulate economic growth in these highly marginalized areas. Already nowadays, small-scale mining with thousands of informal jobs poses a threat to the conservation of the region as it is rich in diamonds, cobalt, copper and oil. Significantly fostering employment would require larger scale investments (e.g. roads, energy, etc.) and regulatory changes (e.g. privatization of eco-tourism) that go far beyond the scope of the project and the TNS, and most of such measures would counteract conservation objectives.

FTNS was the appropriate actor for the implementation. The consolidation of this entity was even an implicit objective of the project.

To summarize: The project was addressing a well-documented environmental issue, it is well aligned with partners' and IKI's priorities, and it was timely to initiate a key step in a crucial institutional process. Therefore, the relevance of the project is considered as good.

**Relevance rating: 2**

**Effectiveness**

In the appraisal document the project objective is stated as “The TNS landscape is ecologically and socio-economically sustainably managed”. However, to be more realistic and in line with the project measures, the objective is restated here as “kick-starting the respective transnational management dynamic”. The appraisal report lists 5 indicators for the project objective; additionally it names 4 expected results that are only partly identical to the indicators. Some of these indicators or results correspond to outputs that at most could serve as a proxy for outcomes, and one indicator (forest and wildlife resources of the TNS are protected) is an impact indicator and therefore is discussed in the impact section. The remaining indicators and expected results are listed in an integrated and more structured framework below together the observable achievements.

Objective	Indicator	Status ex-post (2017)
<p><b>Initiate coordinated sustainable management of the three protected areas (adapted ex-post)</b></p>	<p>TNS long term vision is finalized and endorsed through adoption of an updated land-use plan (result 1)</p>	<p>Achieved: land use-plan is validated and adopted in all 3 countries; governments regularly refer to it for substantiating high level political decisions, such as the decision on the special protection and weapons' embargo status in CAR, mining ban declaration... There are weaknesses in its implementation, however (illegal mining, unsustainable practices in neighboring forest concessions, etc.)</p>
	<p>Increase in the number and scope of transnational patrols</p>	<p>Mainly Achieved.</p>
	<p>a) The tri-national anti-poaching brigade is established, equipped, trained and staffed (indicator 2 and result 2 – output level).</p> <p>b) Surveillance personnel is recruited for the TNS and trained (indicator 3 – output level)</p>	<p>a) Achieved</p> <p>b) Achieved: Personnel is recruited, TNS governance is functional.</p>

	<p>c) Number of tri-national anti-poaching missions per year is tripled by end of 2009 (indicator 4)</p> <p>-</p> <p><i>Conservation is recognized as more effective at the joint/transnational level than at the national level. (added ex-post)</i></p>	<p>c) Partly achieved: The number of tri-national patrols grew, but not in the envisaged quantity; according to the final reporting 2008: 6, 2009: 10, 2010: 12; more recent comparable numbers not available: 12 % of all patrols were tri-national in 2016 (also see text below)</p> <p>At operational level, a clear added value is observed on anti-poaching efforts. The results are more limited for other dimensions of conservation.</p>
<p><b>New and rehabilitated infrastructures are functional and adequately used</b></p>	<p>The TNS infrastructure is renovated and improved as well as adequately used (added ex-post) for the benefit of the local communities and the surveillance personnel (added ex-post) (without additions=result 3)</p>	<p>Partially achieved: infrastructure was built, but is only partially functional; in CAR medical personnel were assigned to the health station very late; low usage/unsustainability of infrastructure (mainly tourism) in Cameroon.</p>
<p><b>The economic potential of ecotourism is enhanced</b></p>	<p>Income from ecotourism is increased by at least 30 % by end of 2010 (indicator 5)</p>	<p>Not achieved: The highest potential is in CAR, but tourism almost came to a standstill due to security; the potential in the other parks is much lower and realizing it would require heavy investment in infrastructure</p>
<p><b>Knowledge on biodiversity and climate change is improved through applied research in TNS (result 4)</b></p>	<p>Research outputs: partnerships, conferences, papers, databases.</p>	<p>Partially achieved: one of the two research initiatives led to a scientific publication, but results were hardly disseminated.</p>

In the majority, the above listed sub-goals and corresponding expected results and indicators were reasonable considering the amount of resources and the allotted timeframe of the project. A clear exception is the expectation that income from ecotourism should be increased by 30 %



which seems far too ambitious considering the region's fragile security situation. The other expected results and indicators were either met or at least partly achieved.


However, when looking at the implementation of sustainable management, results appear to be concentrated in the national parks and little effects are reported on the surrounding areas within the TNS "landscape" covered in the land use plan. For example, a concertation committee had been initially set up to deal with Lobéké surroundings (the Unité technique opérationnelle – UTO – Sud-Est) and small funds were raised from logging companies and hunting guides to organize anti-poaching patrols by eco-guards accompanied by gendarmes. The relationship between these stakeholders had been built up in the time preceding the BMUB project, thanks in particular to the support of a previous GTZ (German Corporation for Technical Cooperation, now GIZ) project<sup>1</sup>. However, the increasing complexity of MINFOF's (Ministry of Forests and Fauna) local structure and the mismanagement of these funds negatively affected this dynamic and the coordination has ceased. Also in CAR, when a concession was granted in the "special reserve", the APDS partners demanded that the logging company commits to sustainable management standards, but the latter did not consent to go beyond compliance with the standard regulations applicable to any timber harvesting in CAR. The TNS partners were not able to do anything in this regard when this operator installed its base camp near the National Park or when a felling area was put into production at the immediate border of the National Park. In the RC TNS peripheral zone, however, a joint project supported by USAID and GEF (Global Environment Facility) led to more positive experiences: It offers support for sustainable management in the Nouabélé-Ndoki concessions (PROGEPP), located in the buffer zone of the RC Nouabélé-Ndoki national park. Here operational cooperation with the park authorities seems to be welcomed.

Patrol activities have gradually increased in and around the three parks, with a rising number of infractions being sanctioned. In Lobéké, 2,243 man-days (m-d) were allocated to patrols in 2011, compared to 11,981 in 2017. However, the number of patrols has only slightly increased in Lobéké, from 88 in 2010 to 107 in 2017, suggesting that each patrol is much longer and consists of a much larger number of men. Similar data were not available for the other parks in 2011, but efforts in 2017 were 11,981 m-d in NNNP, as mentioned above, and 13,821 m-d in ADPS. Surveillance efforts through joint bi- and tri-national patrols have also gradually increased and represented 12 % of all patrols in 2016.

Remaining weaknesses in the implementation of the conservation strategy and land use plan in the parks and particularly in the buffer zones go along with increasing threats.

Human pressure (extraction of firewood, hunting) rises, particularly in the East

**Figure 2: Increasing population density (2015 estimate)**



Source: www.worldpop.org; African population count data: Linard et al. Population distribution, settlement patterns and accessibility across Africa in 2010, PLoS ONE, 7(2): e31743.

<sup>1</sup> Project named "Participatory management of natural resources UTO Sud Est Cameroun" and ended in 2010:

(Cameroon) and North (CAR) of the TNS, with population growth and the influx of people displaced by the Central African conflict.

Poaching threats are also escalating with heavily armed and violent actors. An eco-guard was killed and a soldier seriously injured in December 2016 in a confrontation with poachers in the Cameroonian part of the TNS landscape. A similar incident had already occurred in 2011, resulting in the death of a guard. A memorandum of understanding was signed enabling MINFOF officers to obtain military reinforcements to combat poaching. But even the army is struggling to cope with poachers' firepower: 6 soldiers were killed in February 2018 in a confrontation in a protected area further north.

German cooperation explicitly excludes any funding of weapons or ammunition for eco-guards, which implies that if guards are to be armed the weapons have to be provided by national governments. Eco-guards in Congo and CAR are armed, but the Cameroonian teams began to receive weapons no earlier than the end of 2015. The quantity is still very limited. The supply of ammunition in CAR is also problematic because the country is under an UN Security Council arms embargo since 2013 that has since been extended several times, most recently in January 2018. Although the TNS is officially exempt from this embargo, it creates severe sourcing difficulties.

It should be noted, however, that the enforcement mandate of the eco-guards also spurs abuse and animosities. In a December 2017 report, the Rainforest Foundation UK reported several violent altercations between eco-guards and villagers: abusive searches, beatings and even gunshot wounds<sup>2</sup>. These accusations must be contextualized. Rainforest UK pursues an agenda opposed to national parks and advocates community-based conservation models instead. The denounced incidents are essentially based on testimonies, but these are fairly precise and thus rather credible. Therefore, these incidents should be investigated by independent bodies.<sup>3</sup> Similar difficulties were encountered in Lobéké<sup>4</sup>, leading to the adoption of a code of conduct for eco-guards. In any case, there should be a much greater effort in capacity building and support for field operations to ensure a satisfactory balance between anti-poaching effectiveness and respect for the rights of local populations.

Summing up, the project has indeed played a key role in starting a transnational cooperation dynamic. However, the latter is concentrating on the political and planning level. Beside a limited number of transnational patrols, field operations remain barely affected by the TNS. Impact on the landscape beyond the borders of national parks is largely missing. Therefore, effectiveness is assessed as below expectations, but still moderately satisfactory.

**Effectiveness rating: 3**

### Overarching impacts on biodiversity and forest preservation

In the appraisal report, the overarching impact objective was stated as: *Natural habitats of the TNS are secured through reduced landscape fragmentation and forest conversion as well as proper surveillance*. No indicators were defined for this objective. To adapt this – again over-ambitious – target to a more realistic level, the impact objective was rephrased ex-post to: “Contribute to the preservation of ecosystem services by protecting endangered species and habitat diversity and the forests’ carbon stock”. Furthermore, the following table lists indicators

<sup>2</sup> Inès Ayari, Simon Counsell (2017), *Le coût humain de la conservation en République du Congo : Les parcs nationaux de Konkouati-Douli et de Nouabalé Ndoki et leur impact sur les droits et les moyens de subsistance des communautés forestières*, Rainforest Foundation UK, à la page : [www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/media.ashx/le-cout-humain-de-la-conservation-en-la-republique-du-congo-2017.pdf](http://www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/media.ashx/le-cout-humain-de-la-conservation-en-la-republique-du-congo-2017.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> The relevant operational department of KfW was informed of this finding.

<sup>4</sup> Caramel, L. « Le WWF accusé de « violation des droits de l’homme » au Cameroun », *Le Monde*, 07/01/2017.

for the objective achievements that were added ex-post. It is to be noted that we do not claim any cause-effect-relation between the project measures and the corresponding impact indicator values. Nevertheless, the information contained in the indicator values allows conclusions about general trends in the development of forest preservation and biodiversity in the TNS area.

Objective	Impact indicators	Status
Forest preservation/ climate change mitigation	Difference in forest cover loss (FCL) in project area compared to similar areas and corresponding CO <sub>2</sub> values	FCL in TNS PAs*: 0.019% (2000-08: 142 ha) (8 year period) 0.092% (2008-16: 690 ha) FCL in other PAs**: 0.130% (2000-08) (8 year period) 0.125% (2008-16) Difference-in-difference: -0.079% (-589 ha) Carbon loss after FCL***: 87.86 t/ha. Avoided CO <sub>2</sub> emission from project start****: -5.1 Kt.
Biodiversity conservation/ Poaching reduction	Fauna inventories: elephants, bongos and other endangered key species	Elephants population rapidly decreasing Great apes and other sensitive populations remain stable in protected areas' (see details below)

\* Extracted from: Deforestation Data from Hansen/UMD/Google/USGS/NASA (2017).

\*\* Including all protected areas of category II or more in the 3 countries, source: national forest atlases.

\*\*\* Carbon equivalent estimates extracted from Zapfack, L., et al. "Deforestation and carbon stocks in the surroundings of Lobéké National Park (Cameroon) in the Congo Basin." *Environment and Natural Resources Research* 3.2 (2013): 78-86, which estimated Carbon sequestration to 172.60 t C/ha for primary forest and 84.74 t/ha in young fallows of secondary forest.

\*\*\*\* The result is an adverse one: deforestation has increased in TNS while it was reduced in comparable PA in the same countries. The value is however very small and probably below the detection margin of error of Hansen and al. data, estimated at ±0.13% at national level in Congo Basin country by Sannier et al. "Suitability of Global Forest Change data to report forest cover estimates at national level in Gabon." *Remote sensing of environment* 173 (2016): 326-338.

The research carried out within the BMUB project shows an average storage of 172.60 t C/ha in primary (intact) forests, compared to 84.74 t C/ha in young fallows (after logging) and 169.26 t C/ha in secondary forests (after regeneration). These results suggest a limited added value in terms of climate change and that the interest of conservation is primarily in biodiversity.


Three main lessons can be drawn from the following graph and map (Figure 3):

1. Deforestation increased everywhere between 2001-2008 and 2009-2016, reflecting increasing pressure on forests and biodiversity.
2. Forest cover loss rates decrease as we move closer to national parks. This suggests a certain effectiveness of conservation, even if the difficult accessibility of these areas certainly plays a predominant role<sup>5</sup>.
3. Deforestation levels are very high in the landscape around parks, particularly in CAR, indicating strong pressure, while these areas constitute an essential buffer zone for maintaining biodiversity in national parks.

This last point constitutes an important threat, and shows the limits of the TNS approach to ensure sustainable management of its landscape.

<sup>5</sup> In the Congo Basin as in most developing countries, scientific studies indicate that conservation activities have a low impact on deforestation once geographical accessibility is taken into account, cf. Bowker, J. N., et al. "Effectiveness of Africa's tropical protected areas for maintaining forest cover." *Conservation Biology* 31.3 (2017): 559-569.

**Figure 3: Deforestation is low, but increasing and worrying in RCA buffer zone**



Elaboration by FZE. Sources: Landscape boundaries from the 2010 Land-use plan; National and district boundaries from GADM (2018); Protected areas' boundaries from UNEP-WCMC/ IUCN Protected Planet WDPA (2018); Deforestation Data from Hansen/UMD/Google/USGS/NASA (2017), computed through [www.globalforestwatch.org](http://www.globalforestwatch.org) web-interface.


In late 2017, WWF published a comparative study putting into perspective all the results of wildlife inventories carried out by the NGO in the parks of the region over the past 15 years. In Lobéké, the estimated number of elephants decreased from 2,445 in 2006 to 1,021 in 2015, a drop of 59 % in 9 years. In APDS, the headcount projected from transect surveys has gone from 869 in 2004 to 711 in 2016, i.e. a drop of 18 % in 14 years. While the decrease is unequivocal at Lobéké, it should be noted that the margin of error associated with the sampling coverage at Dzanga Sangha implies that there is no certainty that a decline has actually occurred. It is also established that the sustained number of elephants at Dzanga Sangha results partly from migrations from the surrounding regions, which are subject to greater anthropic pressures<sup>6</sup>. Elephant poaching is nevertheless a common practice in APDS, with even large slaughters. In March 2013, 26 elephants were killed in the same massacre. Even more massive decimations have been observed in Ngola Mintom, where the number of individuals is reported to have fallen from 1,735 in 2011 to 482 in 2015, which corresponds to a drop of 72 % in 4 years. During the same period, elephants have almost disappeared in the neighboring park Boumba Bek, going from 2,062 in 2011 to 143 in 2015.

The methodology used for the great ape inventory changed after 2006 and it is not possible to compare the estimated numbers before and after that date. The information gathered converges to indicate that great ape populations remain stable in Lobéké, as in Dzanga Sangha.

As noted above, it is difficult to establish a clear causal link between these trends and conservation activities. However, an intermediate indicator is available. The systematic recording by WWF in 2016 of signs of human activity in general, and of hunting signs in particular, supports the plausibility of a limited but real conservation effect, particularly in Dzanga Ndoki.

<sup>6</sup> Turkalo, A. et al. (2018). Demography of a forest elephant population. PloS one, 13(2), e0192777.

**Figure 4: Hunting and poaching pressure in TNS Landscape**



Source: data extracted from N'Goran Kouame (coord.), WWF Biomonitoring report, The status of Forest Elephants and Great Apes in Central Africa priority sites, WWF regional office for Africa, oct. 2017

Hunting still exerts significant pressure in the area. In the Sangha Landscape (Lokomo) there is also legal trophy hunting (including elephants and bongos), organized by tour operators, especially German operators<sup>7</sup>. These analyses reveal that human presence is significantly higher in Lobéké Park than in Dzanga Ndoki Park. Unfortunately, there are no comparable time series for hunting, which makes it impossible to compare trends over time. Many documents indicate that wildlife inventories are regularly carried out in Nouabalé Ndoki, but we were unable to obtain them. The only documents that we could use at this stage are socio-anthropological studies on the evolution of local populations' perception of elephants, which show high but decreasing animosity<sup>8</sup>.


Since 2006, the "Sangha group", that is associating partners of the FTNS (WWF, WCS, national forestry and conservation service officers), researchers and local stakeholders (IUCN, forestry companies, elected officials and focus groups in local communities), has set up a particularly informative monitoring and evaluation system<sup>9</sup>. The data they produce indicate that at the scale of the TNS landscape, an overall slight progress has been observed in human development, with marginal improvements in infrastructure and stable socio-economic conditions, even if poverty is still far from being defeated. However, these data also suggest deterioration in environmental conditions, especially with regard to global assets, and elephant populations in particular.

Beyond conservation, many stress the contribution of TNS cooperation in improving overall diplomatic relations between these three countries.

<sup>7</sup> See German hunting operators: <http://blaser-safaris.com/wp-content/uploads/kamerun-2018.pdf>, [www.sb-jagdreisen.de/cms/index.php/jagdmoeglichkeiten/afrika2/38-kamerun](http://www.sb-jagdreisen.de/cms/index.php/jagdmoeglichkeiten/afrika2/38-kamerun), <http://www.globus-jagdreisen.de/afrika/kamerun/>. For a nuanced analysis of the phenomenon, see Lescuyer et al. (2016), "Does trophy hunting remain a profitable business model for conserving biodiversity in Cameroon?", *International Forestry Review* 18(1) [available online].  
<sup>8</sup> Nsonsi, Félicien, et al. "Attitudes towards forest elephant conservation around a protected area in northern Congo." *Conservation and Society* 15.1 (2017): 59.  
<sup>9</sup> Sayer, et al. (2016). "Learning from change in the Sangha Tri-National landscape". *International Forestry Review* 18(1), 130-139. See description in appendix.



**Figure 4: Development and conservation trends in TNS landscape**



Source: Sangha group data, graph design re-adapted by FZE.

To sum up, conservation efforts in the TNS have not impeded an acceleration of environmental degradation in the Sangha landscape. However, the evidence gathered suggests that this deterioration would probably have been even stronger without the FTNS dynamic supported by the BMUB. The project seems to have helped to “buy more time” before natural wealth is irretrievably lost. Therefore, the impact of the project is considered – only just about – as ‘moderately satisfactory’.

**Overarching climate and environmental impacts rating note: 3**

**Efficiency**

The project implementation had originally been planned to be completed in a time frame of 25 months (Dec. 2008 – Dec. 2010), but due to administrative bottlenecks and logistical challenges it actually took an additional 12 months (Dec. 2008 – Dec. 2011).

In comparison to the initial budget, cost adaptations became necessary. The cost for the anti-poaching brigade’s (BLAB) infrastructure had been underestimated initially and respective expenses had to be scaled up. But substantial savings were achieved in staff training and remuneration by means of seconding staff to BLAB from national institutions, rather than recruiting ad hoc staff as originally foreseen. The share of FTNS management costs has also increased, in particular due to implementation delays and a higher than expected number of coordination and monitoring visits to protected areas.

The cross-border dimension of the project also entails additional costs due to the logistics required for coordination meetings. For example, the national and tri-national land use plan


validation workshops cost a total of 44,513 EUR. Such amounts, however, remain in line with what is usually observed for activities involving travel between several countries. Investments in infrastructure appear at this stage to have been realized at reasonable costs given the logistical context of the TNS.

Additional resources complementing BMUB funding were mobilized by each park during the same period, mainly from other projects implemented simultaneously by supporting NGOs. The annual operating and investment budgets of the parks vary between 2 and 3 million EUR per year and per park. In Cameroon, it should be stressed that a very significant contribution comes from the national authorities, through the assignment of eco-guards and the payment of staff salaries. However, rangers are entitled to additional compensation (allowances, bonuses and fuel purchases) to go in the field.

Tourism investments, on the other hand, are not profitable at all. For example, in 2016, Lobéké received only 78 visitors, generating total cumulative revenues (entrance fees, accommodation, car rental, guides, etc.) of less than 4,466 EUR. The Central African Park received 187 tourists that same year. The management of revenues generated by tourism remains opaque in Lobéké and Nouabalé-Ndoki, and the amounts received by local actors are in reality minimal.

The funds collected by the FTNS aim at securing the operation of the parks and should in principle supplement the resources that the national governments and NGOs mobilize on their side. The FTNS has managed to channel more and more subsidies, as illustrated in the first section of Figure 5. These are beginning to make a significant contribution to the parks. Thus, in 2015, the Parc National de Nouabalé Ndoki (PNNN) had a total annual operating and investment cost of 2.6 million EUR, of which 20 % was financed by the FTNS. For the same year, the APDS had a budget of 1.7 million EUR. Figures for the Parc National de Lobéké (PNL) are more contradictory: a consulting study focusing only on international subsidies for which conventions could be found indicates a 200,149 EUR budget for 2015. But the 2015-2019 PNL business plan indicates a global budget (including salaries of public employees working for the park) of 3.4 million EUR for 2015, of which 1.8 million EUR were classified as “secured” in September 2015.

**Figure 5: BMUB was the first grant managed by FTNS**



\* Project total amounts are equally divided between years of project duration. Therefore the bars do not reflect actual spendings from project funds.

Source: Consolidation by FZE from FTNS and KfW data.

Assessing the allocative efficiency of the use of the project funds, it has to be taken into account that these were the first funds to arrive at FTNS. Instead of financing the project activities listed above, an alternative use of BMUB funds could have been a contribution to the capital endowment of the FTNS Trust Fund intended to cover some of the recurrent costs of TNS with the fund’s revenues. In our view, this alternative form of use, rather than in the

chosen form of grants to directly finance activities, would not have been appropriate. On the one hand, no other funds had arrived yet in 2008, and political dynamics in favor of TNS needed financial backing. On the other hand, the expected yield of such investment into the capital endowment would have brought little financial relief (yield expected around 1.8 % / year, net of management costs; see annex for a description of the capital structure of FTNS).

The project activities that were financed seemed necessary to kick start the tri-national management, they seem to have been realized in a cost-effective way, and we see no other arrangement that would have been more cost-effective. With the exception of the implementation delays, efficiency is roughly in line with expectations.

**Efficiency rating: 2**

## Sustainability

The assessment of sustainability poses a challenge, because it needs to be assessed in different dimensions. On the one hand, there is the question of ecological and socio-economic sustainability of the TNS landscape as a whole to which the project intended to contribute, even if the contribution could only be expected to be small given the extent of the problems. On the other hand, there is the question of sustainability of the project's results in the narrower sense of whether lasting effects are likely.

We start with the first dimension, the sustainable ecological and socio-economic development of the TNS landscape. As can be expected from the information presented in the impact section, the outlook is pretty worrying. The root problem lies with tensions between ecological conservation objectives and the legitimate interest to protect the livelihoods of local populations and fight poverty, last not least by employment generating economic development. The problem is exacerbated by economic crises and the fragile security situation in the respective countries.

Research undertaken in Cameroon before the formation of the Sangha Tri-National had pointed out the extent to which alternative sources of income were essential to reduce deforestation and hunting, and how the economic crisis was immediately translating into acceleration of environmental degradation<sup>10</sup>. To put it simply: the livelihoods of the local population must be adequately secured otherwise to allow long-term coexistence with the environment.

Without alternative income sources, conservation is likely to have negative implications for human well-being. Two different studies of the area around the PNNN (CAR) in 2013 and 2017 indicated negative effects of conservation on people's livelihoods<sup>11</sup>. Aka populations were particularly affected as their economic survival and social organization is based on hunting. Likewise, studies of the region's rural economy indicate that a significant proportion of the local population depends on bushmeat for food and income generation. With strict conservation rules, communities are prohibited from taking these resources from the protected areas for their subsistence.

The project tackled this problem to a very limited extent, the most important measures being those to stimulate ecotourism, in order to generate additional resources for the parks and generate local employment and economic activity. Unfortunately, the project clearly failed in this respect. The socio-political insecurity linked to the civil war in CAR has largely contributed

<sup>10</sup> Mertens et al. (2000). *Impact of macroeconomic change on deforestation in South Cameroon: Integration of household survey and remotely-sensed data*. World Development, 28(6), 983-999.

<sup>11</sup> Nsonsi et al. (2017), *op. cit.* ; Riddell, M. (2013) "Assessing the impacts of conservation and commercial forestry on livelihoods in Northern Republic of Congo" *Conservation and Society*, 11(3), 199.

to this failure. Outside of CAR, where visitor numbers grow rapidly as soon as security conditions allow it, there is apparently no real tourism potential to be exploited in the parks without prohibitively huge investments. Pilot ecotourism projects financed by other donors (sale of handicrafts to tourists, community development funds through tourism revenues) are recorded to have had similarly disappointing results. Trickle down to the local population from the jobs created in the protected areas (guides, trackers, drivers, etc.) is limited as well. The only significant alternatives in terms of employment remain forestry and mining. The timber sector experienced a severe crisis after 2008 and today many European foresters (Rougier, IFO, Wijma, Alpicam, CIB) face economic difficulties and several have ceased or drastically reduced their activities in the Congo Basin and sold their concessions to local or Asian operators. This often results in the unemployment of workers who quickly turn to poaching. Unfortunately, the European logging companies that are withdrawing are exactly those who committed to sustainable management and certification approaches on the periphery of the TNS parks. The example of the CIB gave hope, because the Singaporean OLAM taking over CIB concessions in 2015 has committed to maintain FSC certification. It is not very likely, however, that this will happen systematically now that forest concessions' handovers are multiplying.

Also job creating mining activities pose a major concern for conservation. Governments have granted exploration permits for gold, diamonds, uranium and iron throughout the Sangha landscape. Active exploration concessions are located on the immediate border of the parks and even encroaching on one-third of the Lobéké National Park. A government meeting in the framework of COMIFAC at the end of 2017 called for the suspension of all mining activities in the area, but it is not certain that it will be acted upon. Mineral prospecting by big players has also attracted dozens of small informal mining operations in the area<sup>12</sup>.

To sum up: The tension between conservation on the one hand and human well-being and economic development on the other hand remains unsolved in the TNS landscape. Therefore, the outlook for ecological and socio-economic sustainability is clearly unsatisfactory.

Turning to the other dimension of sustainability, that is the question whether project results are likely to last, it has to be kept in mind that the project focused on a contribution to conservation via kick-starting transnational sustainable park management.

In respect to the durability of project results, the outlook is more positive: the land use plan is recognized by all three national governments, and they officially refer to it. Governments contribute to the management costs of the parks, in Cameroon even a significant portion. Even if there are threats of (legal) mining and logging, it seems unlikely that the positive developments on the political level will be reversed in the future. Also on the institutional level, the future of transnational park management seems to be fairly well secured. FTNS is an established legal entity with a functional organization. Its financial sustainability is backed by the capital endowment. On the operational level, however, results were limited. A transnational anti-poaching brigade exists, but the number of tri-national patrols is fairly low and there are no improvements in immediate sight. Ecotourism stimulations failed, and some of the infrastructure that was financed is reported to be badly maintained: The facilities built with project funds in Djembé and Kombo are already too degraded to be used. An architect commissioned on site in December 2017 by the FTNS recommends rebuilding them completely. Maintenance seems to be much better in CAR where tourist facilities are more regularly used and the operating theatre of the health center is still in good condition, although it has only recently started to be

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<sup>12</sup> Chupezi et al. (2009), *Study on impacts of artisanal gold and diamond mining on livelihoods and the environment in the Sangha Tri-National Park (TNS) landscape*, Congo Basin, CIFOR-UICN.

used again, after several years of inactivity. In the absence of a clear commitment from park authorities to maintain the infrastructure, it can be expected to deteriorate rapidly.

Summing up, it is likely that there are some lasting positive effects of the project, but clearly below the expected level and most likely deteriorating in the future. Therefore, sustainability is rated as unsatisfactory. Under consideration, however, that no more than a kick off for transnational management could be expected right from the start and that the project helped to “buy time” to tackle the root problems of achieving an adequate balance between ecological and socio-economic sustainability, we will deviate from the regular automatism that an unsatisfactory sustainability rating automatically leads to an overall project rating of (moderately) unsatisfactory.

#### **Sustainability rating: 4**

### **Coherence, complementarity and coordination**

The creation of the TNS is the continuation of a strong and long lasting mobilization of environmental NGOs (especially WWF and Conservation International), the World Bank and bilateral cooperation, in particular Germany and the United States. Throughout the 1990s, these actors have issued numerous appeals to the Congo Basin States to create and extend their protected areas, to regulate forest exploitation and to avoid the conversion of forests to other uses. However, researchers analyzing these policies have often pointed out that national and local authorities have officially adopted major conservation measures, but without abstaining in practice from the economic exploitation of the forest. These strategies enable them to circumvent the strict implementation of forest policy reforms that harm economic development while avoiding blame from the international community at the same time<sup>13</sup>. This problem of political ambiguity appears to be less acute in TNS national parks, where governments are - albeit slowly - taking more and more proactive measures, such as restricting mining or assigning more staff. COMIFAC's political support and WWF and WCS's long-standing, strong and ongoing local commitment were determining factors for such recognition.

Government support also takes the form of coordination efforts with the army to combat poaching, which have greatly increased since 2015. In all three countries, military detachments have been located on the borders of the parks and are regularly mobilized for “punching operations” or joint patrols. This being said, poaching of large fauna often relies on the complicity of local elites, the administration and the high-ranking officers. Furthermore, there is no doubt that local monitoring will not be able to significantly reduce elephant poaching. Only drastic and rapid measures against international ivory trafficking could save the Congo Basin forest elephants. But no progress in this direction emerges on the horizon.

There is a great complementarity and continuity between the technical and financial partners who have supported conservation efforts within the TNS area since the late 1990s: EU, USAID, GEF, France, Germany, IUCN, etc. This also leads to reconsider the additionality of each of these supports taken separately. For example, on territorial planning, Cameroon, CAR and Congo were supported separately to develop successive editions of management plans for each of their national parks and surrounding buffer zones. Neighboring forest concessions also received assistance in developing sustainable management plans. Since 2005, USAID's CARPE program helped TNS members to pool these documents, by financing a consultation framework and the adoption of a land use plan. The BMUB project then supported the development of a revised and updated land use plan, adopted by the COMIFAC linked tri-

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<sup>13</sup> Ongolo, S., & Karsenty, A. (2015). *The politics of forestland use in a cunning government: lessons for contemporary forest governance reforms*. *International Forestry Review*, 17(2), 195-209.



national body that oversees the TNS. The content does not vary significantly from one document to another. However, this does not lead to severe duplication: the territory is vast, complex and subject to changing pressures. Therefore, planning exercises must be regularly updated, in order to adapt to changing challenges, remobilize partners and increase the level of institutional recognition. It is therefore desirable to keep up this continuity in donor support. Nevertheless, the additional impact of each new phase of support must be put into perspective.

The BMUB project's support for a transnational brigade and for scientific work on carbon sequestration was clearly innovative. Such activities had been recommended in previous projects, but never realized before this project.

All in all, particularly in view of the excellent donor coordination and political support for TNS, coherence, complementarity and coordination are considered good.

### **Coherence, complementarity and coordination rating: 2**

#### **Project management**

Project management was a demanding task for several reasons: The project included a large number of small-scale measures, most of which had not been planned and prepared in detail before the start of the project. For some activities, such as the establishment of the anti-poaching brigade, concrete planning was the first milestone of implementation. Additional challenges came with adjustments made during project implementation, for example because some initially planned activities were funded by other projects. Furthermore, it was a multi-partner project in remote areas. Such adjustments are almost inevitable and common practice in these settings.

Protected area management is functional. Each area management carries out a significant volume of activities and regularly reports on these operations. Recurrent difficulties, however, occur due to the different governance systems in each country.

In Cameroon, the management of national parks is a government responsibility and WWF has only a supporting role. Cameroon is a state with a strong government, and the protected areas' supervisory authority (MINFOF) is very centralized, with a hierarchical structure that does not favor direct coordination between the park administrator and the district representative of the Ministry. MINFOF's organizational culture emphasizes forest exploitation rather than conservation and its staff turnover is high. The smooth operation of the park and the FTNS supported projects relies to a large extent on the voluntary commitment of the park administrator and on his personal relationship with the local WWF representative. Given the remote location of the project, WWF Cameroon has repeatedly struggled to recruit its local manager and field staff. Despite of this difficulty, the coordination between WWF and MINFOF has been very fluid during the BMUB project, facilitated by the - then functional - local stakeholder coordination unit: the UTO Sud-Est. But the situation deteriorated rapidly, after personnel fluctuations which subsequently led to the UTO becoming dysfunctional<sup>14</sup>. These incidents have been the source of organizational crises for the activities supported by the FTNS as a follow-up to the BMUB project. At the time of this evaluation's field mission the crises had been overcome after long negotiations, with the involvement of the highest hierarchical levels of MINFOF, WWF and FTNS.

The institutional framework in CAR is similar to the one in Cameroon, with one notable difference: deficiencies of the public administration have been aggravated by two civil wars that the country has gone through since 2004. As a result, WWF is the only source of remuneration

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<sup>14</sup> See "Effectiveness" section of the report, p. 6.

for staff when the state no longer pays civil servants or vehicle fuel. This gives the NGO a de facto leading role in the management of the park that actually serves to minimize bottlenecks. Perhaps also stimulated by WWF's leading role, the park in CAR is the only one with a pretty regular stream of visitors. These visits, often by people committed in a personal or professional way to the protection of the environment, were reported to have virtuous effects on the management of the park. Despite of this stimulating atmosphere, some operational disturbances occurred in the management during the period 2015 to 2017 until both the national expert from the government and the local WWF-coordinator identified as the main sources of these malfunctions were dismissed.

The Congolese part of the TNS works quite differently to Cameroon and CAR. The national conservation structure (Agence congolaise de la faune et des aires protégées) has the status of a legal entity and it has management autonomy. The government also favors a public-private partnership model for the management of selected parks, including Nouabalé Ndoki. Since 1996, the NGO 'Wildlife Conservation Society' (WCS)<sup>15</sup> has thus held the position as an official state delegate responsible for the park administration. In comparison to the other TNS parks, the arrangement in RC leads to a more limited scope for FTNS in the continual coordination and negotiation necessities. Unfortunately, the management autonomy of the park administration does not seem to encourage accountability and reporting as the FTNS complains about difficulties in obtaining information on activities' programming and implementation in Nouabalé Ndoki.

Compliance with financial procedures is a constant source of tension between the FTNS and the NGOs WWF and WCS. The FTNS criticizes NGOs for not respecting the accounting regulations agreed in the TNS framework and for not consistently controlling expenditures. The NGOs complain reciprocally that FTNS's monitoring requirements are excessively high, in particular in regard to the frequency and the nature of the receipts required for the renewal of advance funds. In addition to a lack of staff capacity, there seems to be reluctance from the NGOs - and in particular from WCS - to share their accounts, probably to keep a greater autonomy of action.

To sum up, project management quality comes up to expectations, taking into account the transnational dimension and geographical remoteness of the TNS.

**Project management rating: 2**

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<sup>15</sup> WCS is a US-American NGO with offices in countries with wildlife hotspots.

## List of Abbreviations

<b>APDS</b>	<i>Aires protégées de Dzanga Sangha – protected area of Dzanga Sangha</i>
<b>BLAB</b>	<i>Brigade de lutte anti-braconnage – Anti-poaching brigade</i>
<b>BMU</b>	<i>Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit</i>
<b>BMUB</b>	<i>Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit</i>
<b>CAR</b>	<i>Central African Republic</i>
<b>COMIFAC</b>	<i>Commission des Forêts d'Afrique Centrale – Central African Forests Commission</i>
<b>FTNS</b>	<i>Foundation for the TNS</i>
<b>GEF</b>	<i>Global Environment Facility</i>
<b>GIZ</b>	<i>German Corporation for International Cooperation – Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
<b>GTZ</b>	<i>German Corporation for Technical Cooperation – Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i>
<b>MINFOF</b>	<i>Ministère des forêts et de la faune – Ministry for forest and fauna</i>
<b>PNL</b>	<i>Parc National de Lobéké – Lobéké National Park</i>
<b>PNNN</b>	<i>Parc National de Nouabalé Ndoki - Nouabale Ndoki National Park</i>
<b>PROGEPP</b>	<i>Projet de gestion des écosystèmes périphériques au Parc National Nouabalé-Ndoki - The Project for Ecosystem Management in the Nouabalé-Ndoki Periphery Area</i>
<b>RC</b>	<i>Republic of the Congo</i>
<b>TNS</b>	<i>Trinational de la Sangha - Sangha Trinational</i>
<b>UTO</b>	<i>Unité technique opérationnelle – Operational technical unit</i>
<b>WDPA</b>	<i>World Database on Protected Areas</i>
<b>WCS</b>	<i>Wildlife Conservation Society</i>
<b>WWF</b>	<i>World Wide Fund for Nature</i>

## Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, overarching developmental impact, coherence, complementarity and coordination rating and project management**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental impact of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental impact of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental impact of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental impact of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all seven individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).